Discernment of relevation in the Gospel of Matthew

EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

From prediction to function: Polyamine biosynthesis and formate metabolism in the α- and ε-Proteobacteria

EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Eyes to see and ears to hear: Discernment of revelation in the gospel of Mark

The biblical tradition affirms that God reveals himself, but also that such revelation is hidden and diverse, surprising and paradoxical. The aim of this study is to examine how Mark understands revelation to be given and discerned. A redaction-critical approach is taken for this study of one aspect of Mark's theology, although insights from literary criticism are also used. Mark understands Jesus' death to be the most important event and place where God is revealed. In order to understand this correctly, as well as Jesus' teaching and miracles, a certain spiritual discernment is necessary, and the biblical tradition uses hearing and seeing as metaphors for this. How and under what circumstances such discernment becomes possible and what kinds of things or attitudes help or hinder the process are explored. The first two chapters show how revelation is given and discerned in the OT and in Jewish apocalyptic literature. The main part of the study, chapter 3, explores how Mark takes up and develops these themes and how he uses Jesus ‘teaching and miracles in a symbolic way to lead both the disciples and his readers on a journey of revelation, suffering and humility. Discernment of revelation also has social consequences, and for Mark the people of God are now seen as those who have discerned God's revelation in Jesus

Sharing news, making sense, saying thanks: patterns of talk on Twitter during the Queensland floods

Abstract: This paper examines the discursive aspects of Twitter communication during the floods in the summer of 2010–2011 in Queensland, Australia. Using a representative sample of communication associated with the #qldfloods hashtag on Twitter, we coded and analysed the patterns of communication. We focus on key phenomena in the use of social media in crisis communication: communal sense-making practices, the negotiation of participant roles, and digital convergence around shared events. Social media is used both as a crisis communication and emergency management tool, as well as a space for participants to engage in emotional exchanges and communication of distress.Authored by Frances Shaw, Jean Burgess, Kate Crawford and Axel Bruns

Realising potential and recognising paradox: The national induction and mentoring project

Although comprehensive policy and resourcing of beginning teacher induction and mentoring can improve teacher retention and quality, there is growing recognition that combining on-site leadership and policy is integral to providing effective learning for teachers. This has led to an increased interest in melding policy and resources with school and service leadership to promote consistency of beginning teachers’ induction and mentoring experiences. This article describes and provides insights into a project involving four pilots which are trialling the draft national guidelines for effective induction programmes and mentor teacher development. An external evaluation across the four pilots has revealed that national guidelines can be a positive lever for effecting change in induction and mentoring practices. Implementing such change nationally will require leaders to take seriously an educative, transformative approach to learning for both beginning teachers and their mentors

Social media and its impact on crisis communication: Case studies of Twitter use in emergency management in Australia and New Zealand

There is a growing awareness worldwide of the significance of social media to communication in times of both natural and human-created disasters and crises. While the media have long been used as a means of broadcasting messages to communities in times of crisis – bushfires, floods, earthquakes etc. – the significance of social media in enabling many-to-many communication through ubiquitous networked computing and mobile media devices is becoming increasingly important in the fields of disaster and emergency management. This paper undertakes an analysis of the uses made of social media during two recent natural disasters: the January 2011 floods in Brisbane and South-East Queensland in Australia, and the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. It is part of a wider project being undertaken by a research team based at the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, Australia, that is working with the Queensland Department of Community Safety (DCS) and the EIDOS Institute, and funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) through its Linkages program. The project combines large-scale, quantitative social media tracking and analysis techniques with qualitative cultural analysis of communication efforts by citizens and officials, to enable both emergency management authorities and news media organisations to develop, implement, and evaluate new social media strategies for emergency communication

Transcendental Idealism F.S.

This paper presents an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories, based primarily on the “two-step” argument of the B deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. I undertake to show that Kant’s distinction between the “pure forms of intuition” and “pure formal intuition” is successful in its attempt to prove that all sensible intuitions presuppose the a priori categories, in a way which is compatible, I claim, with Kant’s statements (in the Aesthetic and elsewhere) that sensible intuition is prior to all concepts; and therefore that the Transcendental Aesthetic presupposes the Transcendental Analytic. Thus my Interpretation is a "conceptualist" reading of the deduction, in holding that perception, as receptivity, presupposes an underlying spontaneity of the pure understanding and categories. The categories are held to be not just compatible with all possible sensible intuitions, but through their "transcendental content" constitutive of the relation of sensible intuitions to objects - and this explains how our thought can represent objects a priori. It is one of the claims of my interpretation that the logical forms of judgment of general logic derive from the pure categories of transcendental logic, rather than vice-versa. I.e. that the logical forms through which we make empirical judgments by combining analytical concepts in inner sense in time, are originally grounded in an atemporal categorial synthesis in pure intuition (i.e. in the form of time but not the dimension of time), referring an outer intuition in general to the transcendental object of intuition (as “something in general” outside sensibility or receptivity), thereby providing the synthetic unity of the manifold which “..all analysis presupposes.” My conceptualist reading of the deduction, I claim, avoids the problems associated with other conceptualist readings, for example inconsistency with the text (“Intuitions are prior to all concepts.” etc.) and blurring of the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. In my paper I prove that the categories can correctly be held to provide the a priori unity of intuitions, notwithstanding the fact that the latter are “prior to all concepts,” because this unity is not provided by the categories as fully-fledged concepts in the empirical subject, but as the transcendental logical form of these concepts, as a unity in the pure understanding - and the categories therefore require their empirical content or application for their objective reality as concepts. I.e. the categories, as logical functions of judgment for transcendental apperception, in the pure forms of intuition, are prior to all "concepts", correctly speaking, as well as prior to all intuitions, and provide the necessary unity of both. Likewise, at the empirical level my version of conceptualism cannot be accused of blurring the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, or sensibility and understanding, because although the transcendental content of the categories, as a logical function of judgment in the pure forms of intuition, in transcendental apperception, is in necessary relation to sensibility (in combining the manifold in the pure or formal representation of the transcendental object) their empirical content is not. - At the empirical level the divide between spontaneity (as judgment in the empirical subject) and receptivity (as the effect of transcendental synthesis and the transcendental object on outer and inner sense) remains intact. Conceptualist readings of the deduction also have to avoid infringing Kant’s requirement that the sensible manifold originally be given prior to and independently of all acts of the understanding, or otherwise to qualify the requirement in some way - e.g. by taking a Hegelian direction, such as that taken by John McDowell.1 On my reading of the deduction the sensible manifold given indeterminately in the pure forms of space and time must be given prior to the categorial synthesis of the manifold in the pure representation of the transcendental object, i.e. in the pure 'concept' of an object in general affecting sensibility. Therefore Kant’s requirement for an undetermined manifold given prior to, and independently of, all acts of the understanding (“..the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined” [cf.B145/146]) is not infringed. In a later section of the paper, however, I will argue that the transcendental object (of intuition) does have pure theoretical reason as one of its two interacting immanent aspects, but is distinct from pure theoretical reason in the other of its (the transcendental object of intuition's) two interacting immanent aspects, i.e. pure will, which adds a Schopenhauerian element to my interpretation (which will be argued for in a way which supports Kantian optimism over Schopenhauerian pessimism however, in regard to the freedom of the will). Another perceived inconsistency in the deduction, which my interpretation can explain, is Kant’s description (in the B deduction) of the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception as analytic, while in the A deduction it is described as synthetic. I explain this as a difference in the reference of terms such as “my representations” in the two versions - a transcendental reference in the B version but an empirical and transcendental reference in the A version of the principle. I also show that the first part of the two-step B deduction can correctly be characterised by Kant as analytic and the second, concluding part, synthetic (a point of dispute amongst Kant scholars) because transcendental logic (which refers to both the analytic and synthetic aspects of the principle of apperception) “does not abstract from the pure content of knowledge.” While being a “double aspect” rather than “two world” view of transcendental Idealism (because objects of intuition are comprised of both the empirical and transcendental object, i.e. transcendental referent, of intuition, my view differs significantly from the “double aspect” interpretation of Henry Allison (which distinguishes empirical reality from the “God’s eye” view). The view of transcendental idealism resulting from my reading of the deduction, I claim, allows a full empirical realism, because empirical intuitions, as objects of cognition, are the appearance of both the transcendental subject and the transcendental object (i.e. transcendental referent ) of transcendental synthesis (both as “something in general” outside sensibility or receptivity, or rather outside sensibility as receptivity). I conclude that Kant succeeds (although only with the addition of what I have called my 'Schopenhauerian element') in his attempt to prove that we have a transcendental unity of apperception which both constitutes, and is constituted by, the relation of sensible representations to objects, and that since transcendental apperception is the a priori underlying ground of empirical apperception, the categories (as the logical functions of judgment by which transcendental apperception relates sensible representations to objects) are the a priori underlying ground of all experience, and are therefore valid synthetically a priori for all objects of experience. 1 E.g. in “On Pippin’s Postscript.” European Journal of Philosophy 15:3 pp. 395-410

The importance of tectonic setting in assessing European Rare Earth potential

Rare earth element (REE) resources are commonly found associated with alkaline igneous complexes or carbonatites, or as secondary deposits derived from igneous rocks. Globally, many REE deposits occur around the margins of Archaean cratons, most in continental rift zones. Europe contains many such rift zones, which are generally younger in the south. Many of these rifts are intracontinental, whereas others are associated with the opening of oceans such as the Atlantic. All these rift systems have the potential to host REE resources, but whereas the older provinces of northern Europe are deeply exposed, exposures in southern Europe are largely at the supracrustal level. This paper considers how an understanding of the tectonic setting of Europe’s REE resources is vital to guide future exploration

Alkaline magmatism and REE resources: a European overview, and links to Canada

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has prioritised the issue of critical raw materialsa – those materials which are important for the economy, but have risks to their supply. Of the materials identified as critical, the rare earth elements (REE) are considered to have the highest supply risks, since > 90% of global production comes from China. Several programmes are underway in Europe to investigate the supply chain for the REE and other critical materials. These include the EU-funded EURARE projectb, which aims to set the basis for the development of a European REE industry; and the Security of Supply of Mineral Resources (SoS Minerals) research programme in the UK

Enstranglements: performing within, and exiting from, the arts-in-health 'setting'

The following text explores performative art works commissioned within a specific ‘arts and health’ cultural setting, namely that of a medical school within a British university. It examines the degree to which the professional autonomy of the artists (and curator) were 'instrumentalized' and diminished as a result of having to fit into normative frames set by institutional agendas (in this case, that of ‘the neoliberal university’). We ask, to what extent do such 'entanglements', feel more like ‘enstranglements’, suffocating the artist's capacity to envision the world afresh or any differently? What kinds of pressures allow for certain kinds of ‘evidence’ to be read and made visible, (and not others)? Are You Feeling Better? was a 2016 programme curated by Frances Williams, challenging simplistic expectations that the arts hold any automatic power of their own to make ‘things better’ in healthcare. It included two performative projects – The Secret Society of Imperfect Nurses, by Anthony Schrag with student nurses at Kings College London, and Hiding in Plain Sight by Becky Shaw (plus film with Rose Butler) with doctoral researchers in nursing and midwifery. These projects were situated in a climate of UK National Health Service cuts and austerity measures where the advancement of social prescribing looks dangerously like the government abnegating responsibility and offering art as amelioration. The text therefore examines the critical ‘stage’ on which these arts-health projects were performed and the extent to which critical reflection is welcomed within institutional contexts, how learning is framed, expressed aesthetically, as well as understood as art practice (as much as ‘education’ or ‘learning’). It further examines how artistic projects might offer sites of resistance, rejection and mechanisms of support against constricting institutional norms and practices that seek to instrumentalize artistic works to their own ends